Initial vendor packages

Signed-off-by: Valentin Popov <valentin@popov.link>

1 files changed, 1007 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs
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+//! Linux `prctl` wrappers.
+//!
+//! Rustix wraps variadic/dynamic-dispatch functions like `prctl` in
+//! type-safe wrappers.
+//!
+//! # Safety
+//!
+//! The inner `prctl` calls are dynamically typed and must be called
+//! correctly.
+#![allow(unsafe_code)]
+
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+use core::num::NonZeroU64;
+use core::ptr;
+use core::ptr::NonNull;
+use core::sync::atomic::AtomicU8;
+
+use bitflags::bitflags;
+
+use crate::backend::c::{c_int, c_uint, c_void};
+use crate::backend::prctl::syscalls;
+use crate::ffi::CStr;
+#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
+use crate::ffi::CString;
+use crate::io;
+use crate::pid::Pid;
+use crate::prctl::{
+    prctl_1arg, prctl_2args, prctl_3args, prctl_get_at_arg2_optional, PointerAuthenticationKeys,
+};
+use crate::utils::as_ptr;
+
+//
+// PR_GET_KEEPCAPS/PR_SET_KEEPCAPS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: c_int = 7;
+
+/// Get the current state of the calling thread's `keep capabilities` flag.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_keep_capabilities() -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: c_int = 8;
+
+/// Set the state of the calling thread's `keep capabilities` flag.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_keep_capabilities(enable: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, usize::from(enable) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_NAME/PR_SET_NAME
+//
+
+#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
+const PR_GET_NAME: c_int = 16;
+
+/// Get the name of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_NAME,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_NAME,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
+pub fn name() -> io::Result<CString> {
+    let mut buffer = [0_u8; 16];
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_GET_NAME, buffer.as_mut_ptr().cast())? };
+
+    let len = buffer.iter().position(|&x| x == 0_u8).unwrap_or(0);
+    CString::new(&buffer[..len]).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::ILSEQ)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_NAME: c_int = 15;
+
+/// Set the name of the calling thread.
+///
+/// Unlike `pthread_setname_np`, this function silently truncates the name to
+/// 16 bytes, as the Linux syscall does.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_NAME,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_NAME,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_name(name: &CStr) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_NAME, name.as_ptr() as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_SECCOMP/PR_SET_SECCOMP
+//
+
+//const PR_GET_SECCOMP: c_int = 21;
+
+const SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED: i32 = 0;
+const SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: i32 = 1;
+const SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: i32 = 2;
+
+/// `SECCOMP_MODE_*`.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+pub enum SecureComputingMode {
+    /// Secure computing is not in use.
+    Disabled = SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED,
+    /// Use hard-coded filter.
+    Strict = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT,
+    /// Use user-supplied filter.
+    Filter = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<i32> for SecureComputingMode {
+    type Error = io::Errno;
+
+    fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED => Ok(Self::Disabled),
+            SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT => Ok(Self::Strict),
+            SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER => Ok(Self::Filter),
+            _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+/// Get the secure computing mode of the calling thread.
+///
+/// If the caller is not in secure computing mode, this returns
+/// [`SecureComputingMode::Disabled`]. If the caller is in strict secure
+/// computing mode, then this call will cause a [`Signal::Kill`] signal to be
+/// sent to the process. If the caller is in filter mode, and this system call
+/// is allowed by the seccomp filters, it returns
+/// [`SecureComputingMode::Filter`]; otherwise, the process is killed with a
+/// [`Signal::Kill`] signal.
+///
+/// Since Linux 3.8, the Seccomp field of the `/proc/[pid]/status` file
+/// provides a method of obtaining the same information, without the risk that
+/// the process is killed; see [the `proc` manual page].
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+/// [the `proc` manual page]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc.5.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn secure_computing_mode() -> io::Result<SecureComputingMode> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_SECCOMP) }.and_then(TryInto::try_into)
+}
+*/
+
+const PR_SET_SECCOMP: c_int = 22;
+
+/// Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread, to limit the
+/// available system calls.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_secure_computing_mode(mode: SecureComputingMode) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_SECCOMP, mode as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_CAPBSET_READ/PR_CAPBSET_DROP
+//
+
+const PR_CAPBSET_READ: c_int = 23;
+
+/// Linux per-thread capability.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u32)]
+pub enum Capability {
+    /// In a system with the `_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED` option defined, this
+    /// overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
+    /// ownership.
+    ChangeOwnership = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHOWN,
+    /// Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if `_POSIX_ACL`
+    /// is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
+    /// [`Capability::LinuxImmutable`].
+    DACOverride = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
+    /// Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files and
+    /// directories, including ACL restrictions if `_POSIX_ACL` is defined.
+    /// Excluding DAC access covered by [`Capability::LinuxImmutable`].
+    DACReadSearch = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
+    /// Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
+    /// file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where
+    /// [`Capability::FileSetID`] is applicable. It doesn't override MAC
+    /// and DAC restrictions.
+    FileOwner = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FOWNER,
+    /// Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID shall
+    /// match the file owner ID when setting the `S_ISUID` and `S_ISGID`
+    /// bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
+    /// supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting the
+    /// `S_ISGID` bit on that file; that the `S_ISUID` and `S_ISGID` bits are
+    /// cleared on successful return from `chown` (not implemented).
+    FileSetID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FSETID,
+    /// Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
+    /// process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID of
+    /// the process receiving the signal.
+    Kill = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_KILL,
+    /// Allows `setgid` manipulation. Allows `setgroups`. Allows forged gids on
+    /// socket credentials passing.
+    SetGroupID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETGID,
+    /// Allows `set*uid` manipulation (including fsuid). Allows forged pids on
+    /// socket credentials passing.
+    SetUserID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETUID,
+    /// Without VFS support for capabilities:
+    ///  - Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid.
+    ///  - remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid. With VFS
+    ///    support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
+    ///  - Add any capability from current's capability bounding set to the
+    ///    current process' inheritable set.
+    ///  - Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set.
+    ///  - Allow modification of the securebits for a process.
+    SetPermittedCapabilities = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETPCAP,
+    /// Allow modification of `S_IMMUTABLE` and `S_APPEND` file attributes.
+    LinuxImmutable = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE,
+    /// Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024. Allows binding to ATM
+    /// VCIs below 32.
+    NetBindService = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
+    /// Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast.
+    NetBroadcast = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BROADCAST,
+    /// Allow interface configuration. Allow administration of IP firewall,
+    /// masquerading and accounting. Allow setting debug option on sockets.
+    /// Allow modification of routing tables. Allow setting arbitrary
+    /// process / process group ownership on sockets. Allow binding to any
+    /// address for transparent proxying (also via [`Capability::NetRaw`]).
+    /// Allow setting TOS (type of service). Allow setting promiscuous
+    /// mode. Allow clearing driver statistics. Allow multicasting. Allow
+    /// read/write of device-specific registers. Allow activation of ATM
+    /// control sockets.
+    NetAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+    /// Allow use of `RAW` sockets. Allow use of `PACKET` sockets. Allow
+    /// binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via
+    /// [`Capability::NetAdmin`]).
+    NetRaw = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_RAW,
+    /// Allow locking of shared memory segments. Allow mlock and mlockall
+    /// (which doesn't really have anything to do with IPC).
+    IPCLock = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_LOCK,
+    /// Override IPC ownership checks.
+    IPCOwner = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_OWNER,
+    /// Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit.
+    SystemModule = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_MODULE,
+    /// Allow ioperm/iopl access. Allow sending USB messages to any device via
+    /// `/dev/bus/usb`.
+    SystemRawIO = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+    /// Allow use of `chroot`.
+    SystemChangeRoot = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
+    /// Allow `ptrace` of any process.
+    SystemProcessTrace = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+    /// Allow configuration of process accounting.
+    SystemProcessAccounting = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PACCT,
+    /// Allow configuration of the secure attention key. Allow administration
+    /// of the random device. Allow examination and configuration of disk
+    /// quotas. Allow setting the domainname. Allow setting the hostname.
+    /// Allow `mount` and `umount`, setting up new smb connection.
+    /// Allow some autofs root ioctls. Allow nfsservctl. Allow
+    /// `VM86_REQUEST_IRQ`. Allow to read/write pci config on alpha. Allow
+    /// `irix_prctl` on mips (setstacksize). Allow flushing all cache on
+    /// m68k (`sys_cacheflush`). Allow removing semaphores. Used instead of
+    /// [`Capability::ChangeOwnership`] to "chown" IPC message queues,
+    /// semaphores and shared memory. Allow locking/unlocking of shared
+    /// memory segment. Allow turning swap on/off. Allow forged pids on
+    /// socket credentials passing. Allow setting readahead and
+    /// flushing buffers on block devices. Allow setting geometry in floppy
+    /// driver. Allow turning DMA on/off in `xd` driver. Allow
+    /// administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
+    /// extra ioctls). Allow tuning the ide driver. Allow access to the nvram
+    /// device. Allow administration of `apm_bios`, serial and bttv (TV)
+    /// device. Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver.
+    /// Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space.
+    /// Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver. Allow setting up serial ports.
+    /// Allow sending raw qic-117 commands. Allow enabling/disabling tagged
+    /// queuing on SCSI controllers and sending arbitrary SCSI commands.
+    /// Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem. Allow setting
+    /// zone reclaim policy. Allow everything under
+    /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] and
+    /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] for backward compatibility.
+    SystemAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+    /// Allow use of `reboot`.
+    SystemBoot = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_BOOT,
+    /// Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different UID)
+    /// processes. Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling
+    /// on own processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by
+    /// another process. Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes.
+    /// Allow setting realtime ioprio class. Allow setting ioprio class on
+    /// other processes.
+    SystemNice = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_NICE,
+    /// Override resource limits. Set resource limits. Override quota limits.
+    /// Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem. Modify data journaling
+    /// mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling resources). NOTE: ext2
+    /// honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so you can
+    /// override using fsuid too. Override size restrictions on IPC message
+    /// queues. Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock.
+    /// Override max number of consoles on console allocation. Override max
+    /// number of keymaps. Control memory reclaim behavior.
+    SystemResource = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
+    /// Allow manipulation of system clock. Allow `irix_stime` on mips. Allow
+    /// setting the real-time clock.
+    SystemTime = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TIME,
+    /// Allow configuration of tty devices. Allow `vhangup` of tty.
+    SystemTTYConfig = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+    /// Allow the privileged aspects of `mknod`.
+    MakeNode = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MKNOD,
+    /// Allow taking of leases on files.
+    Lease = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LEASE,
+    /// Allow writing the audit log via unicast netlink socket.
+    AuditWrite = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_WRITE,
+    /// Allow configuration of audit via unicast netlink socket.
+    AuditControl = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL,
+    /// Set or remove capabilities on files. Map `uid=0` into a child user
+    /// namespace.
+    SetFileCapabilities = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETFCAP,
+    /// Override MAC access. The base kernel enforces no MAC policy. An LSM may
+    /// enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses to implement
+    /// capability based overrides of that policy, this is the capability
+    /// it should use to do so.
+    MACOverride = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,
+    /// Allow MAC configuration or state changes. The base kernel requires no
+    /// MAC configuration. An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does
+    /// and it chooses to implement capability based
+    /// checks on modifications to that policy or the data required to maintain
+    /// it, this is the capability it should use to do so.
+    MACAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+    /// Allow configuring the kernel's `syslog` (`printk` behaviour).
+    SystemLog = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYSLOG,
+    /// Allow triggering something that will wake the system.
+    WakeAlarm = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_WAKE_ALARM,
+    /// Allow preventing system suspends.
+    BlockSuspend = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND,
+    /// Allow reading the audit log via multicast netlink socket.
+    AuditRead = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_READ,
+    /// Allow system performance and observability privileged operations using
+    /// `perf_events`, `i915_perf` and other kernel subsystems.
+    PerformanceMonitoring = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_PERFMON,
+    /// This capability allows the following BPF operations:
+    ///  - Creating all types of BPF maps
+    ///  - Advanced verifier features
+    ///     - Indirect variable access
+    ///     - Bounded loops
+    ///     - BPF to BPF function calls
+    ///     - Scalar precision tracking
+    ///     - Larger complexity limits
+    ///     - Dead code elimination
+    ///     - And potentially other features
+    ///  - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data
+    ///  - Retrieve `xlated` and JITed code of BPF programs
+    ///  - Use `bpf_spin_lock` helper
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] relaxes the verifier checks
+    /// further:
+    ///  - BPF progs can use of pointer-to-integer conversions
+    ///  - speculation attack hardening measures are bypassed
+    ///  - `bpf_probe_read` to read arbitrary kernel memory is allowed
+    ///  - `bpf_trace_printk` to print kernel memory is allowed
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::SystemAdmin`] is required to use bpf_probe_write_user.
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::SystemAdmin`] is required to iterate system-wide loaded
+    /// programs, maps, links, and BTFs, and convert their IDs to file
+    /// descriptors.
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] and
+    /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] are required to load tracing
+    /// programs. [`Capability::NetAdmin`] and
+    /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] are required to load
+    /// networking programs.
+    BerkeleyPacketFilters = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BPF,
+    /// Allow checkpoint/restore related operations. Allow PID selection during
+    /// `clone3`. Allow writing to `ns_last_pid`.
+    CheckpointRestore = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE,
+}
+
+/// Check if the specified capability is in the calling thread's capability
+/// bounding set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn capability_is_in_bounding_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAPBSET_READ, capability as usize as *mut _) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_CAPBSET_DROP: c_int = 24;
+
+/// If the calling thread has the [`Capability::SetPermittedCapabilities`]
+/// capability within its user namespace, then drop the specified capability
+/// from the thread's capability bounding set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn remove_capability_from_bounding_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, capability as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_SECUREBITS/PR_SET_SECUREBITS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_SECUREBITS: c_int = 27;
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// `SECBIT_*`.
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct CapabilitiesSecureBits: u32 {
+        /// If this bit is set, then the kernel does not grant capabilities
+        /// when a `set-user-ID-root` program is executed, or when a process
+        /// with an effective or real UID of 0 calls `execve`.
+        const NO_ROOT = 1_u32 << 0;
+        /// Set [`NO_ROOT`] irreversibly.
+        const NO_ROOT_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 1;
+        /// Setting this flag stops the kernel from adjusting the process'
+        /// permitted, effective, and ambient capability sets when the thread's
+        /// effective and filesystem UIDs are switched between zero and nonzero
+        /// values.
+        const NO_SETUID_FIXUP = 1_u32 << 2;
+        /// Set [`NO_SETUID_FIXUP`] irreversibly.
+        const NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 3;
+        /// Setting this flag allows a thread that has one or more 0 UIDs to
+        /// retain capabilities in its permitted set when it switches all of
+        /// its UIDs to nonzero values.
+        const KEEP_CAPS = 1_u32 << 4;
+        /// Set [`KEEP_CAPS`] irreversibly.
+        const KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 5;
+        /// Setting this flag disallows raising ambient capabilities via the
+        /// `prctl`'s `PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE` operation.
+        const NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE = 1_u32 << 6;
+        /// Set [`NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE`] irreversibly.
+        const NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 7;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get the `securebits` flags of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn capabilities_secure_bits() -> io::Result<CapabilitiesSecureBits> {
+    let r = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)? } as c_uint;
+    CapabilitiesSecureBits::from_bits(r).ok_or(io::Errno::RANGE)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_SECUREBITS: c_int = 28;
+
+/// Set the `securebits` flags of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_capabilities_secure_bits(bits: CapabilitiesSecureBits) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits.bits() as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_TIMERSLACK/PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
+//
+
+const PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: c_int = 30;
+
+/// Get the `current` timer slack value of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn current_timer_slack() -> io::Result<u64> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK) }.map(|r| r as u64)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: c_int = 29;
+
+/// Sets the `current` timer slack value for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_current_timer_slack(value: Option<NonZeroU64>) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let value = usize::try_from(value.map_or(0, NonZeroU64::get)).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::RANGE)?;
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, value as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS/PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: c_int = 39;
+
+/// Get the value of the `no_new_privs` attribute for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn no_new_privs() -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: c_int = 38;
+
+/// Set the calling thread's `no_new_privs` attribute.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_no_new_privs(no_new_privs: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, usize::from(no_new_privs) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: c_int = 40;
+
+/// Get the `clear_child_tid` address set by `set_tid_address`
+/// and `clone`'s `CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID` flag.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_clear_child_tid_address() -> io::Result<Option<NonNull<c_void>>> {
+    unsafe { prctl_get_at_arg2_optional::<*mut c_void>(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS) }.map(NonNull::new)
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_THP_DISABLE/PR_SET_THP_DISABLE
+//
+
+const PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: c_int = 42;
+
+/// Get the current setting of the `THP disable` flag for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn transparent_huge_pages_are_disabled() -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: c_int = 41;
+
+/// Set the state of the `THP disable` flag for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn disable_transparent_huge_pages(thp_disable: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, usize::from(thp_disable) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_CAP_AMBIENT
+//
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT: c_int = 47;
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET: usize = 1;
+
+/// Check if the specified capability is in the ambient set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn capability_is_in_ambient_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<bool> {
+    let cap = capability as usize as *mut _;
+    unsafe { prctl_3args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET as *mut _, cap) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL: usize = 4;
+
+/// Remove all capabilities from the ambient set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn clear_ambient_capability_set() -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE: usize = 2;
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER: usize = 3;
+
+/// Add or remove the specified capability to the ambient set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn configure_capability_in_ambient_set(capability: Capability, enable: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let sub_operation = if enable {
+        PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
+    } else {
+        PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER
+    };
+    let cap = capability as usize as *mut _;
+
+    unsafe { prctl_3args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, sub_operation as *mut _, cap) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_SVE_GET_VL/PR_SVE_SET_VL
+//
+
+const PR_SVE_GET_VL: c_int = 51;
+
+const PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK: u32 = 0xffff;
+const PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT: u32 = 1_u32 << 17;
+
+/// Scalable Vector Extension vector length configuration.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub struct SVEVectorLengthConfig {
+    /// Vector length in bytes.
+    pub vector_length_in_bytes: u32,
+    /// Vector length inherited across `execve`.
+    pub vector_length_inherited_across_execve: bool,
+}
+
+/// Get the thread's current SVE vector length configuration.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SVE_GET_VL,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SVE_GET_VL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn sve_vector_length_configuration() -> io::Result<SVEVectorLengthConfig> {
+    let bits = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_SVE_GET_VL)? } as c_uint;
+    Ok(SVEVectorLengthConfig {
+        vector_length_in_bytes: bits & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK,
+        vector_length_inherited_across_execve: (bits & PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT) != 0,
+    })
+}
+
+const PR_SVE_SET_VL: c_int = 50;
+
+const PR_SVE_SET_VL_ONEXEC: u32 = 1_u32 << 18;
+
+/// Configure the thread's vector length of Scalable Vector Extension.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SVE_SET_VL,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function,
+/// as detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SVE_SET_VL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn set_sve_vector_length_configuration(
+    vector_length_in_bytes: usize,
+    vector_length_inherited_across_execve: bool,
+    defer_change_to_next_execve: bool,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let vector_length_in_bytes =
+        u32::try_from(vector_length_in_bytes).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::RANGE)?;
+
+    let mut bits = vector_length_in_bytes & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK;
+
+    if vector_length_inherited_across_execve {
+        bits |= PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT;
+    }
+
+    if defer_change_to_next_execve {
+        bits |= PR_SVE_SET_VL_ONEXEC;
+    }
+
+    prctl_2args(PR_SVE_SET_VL, bits as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS
+//
+
+const PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: c_int = 54;
+
+/// Securely reset the thread's pointer authentication keys to fresh random
+/// values generated by the kernel.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function,
+/// as detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn reset_pointer_authentication_keys(
+    keys: Option<PointerAuthenticationKeys>,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let keys = keys.as_ref().map_or(0_u32, PointerAuthenticationKeys::bits);
+    prctl_2args(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS, keys as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL/PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
+//
+
+const PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: c_int = 56;
+
+const PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT: u32 = 3;
+const PR_MTE_TAG_MASK: u32 = 0xffff_u32 << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT;
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// Zero means addresses that are passed for the purpose of being
+    /// dereferenced by the kernel must be untagged.
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct TaggedAddressMode: u32 {
+        /// Addresses that are passed for the purpose of being dereferenced by
+        /// the kernel may be tagged.
+        const ENABLED = 1_u32 << 0;
+        /// Synchronous tag check fault mode.
+        const TCF_SYNC = 1_u32 << 1;
+        /// Asynchronous tag check fault mode.
+        const TCF_ASYNC = 1_u32 << 2;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get the current tagged address mode for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn current_tagged_address_mode() -> io::Result<(Option<TaggedAddressMode>, u32)> {
+    let r = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL)? } as c_uint;
+    let mode = r & 0b111_u32;
+    let mte_tag = (r & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK) >> PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT;
+    Ok((TaggedAddressMode::from_bits(mode), mte_tag))
+}
+
+const PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: c_int = 55;
+
+/// Controls support for passing tagged user-space addresses to the kernel.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as
+/// detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn set_current_tagged_address_mode(
+    mode: Option<TaggedAddressMode>,
+    mte_tag: u32,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let config = mode.as_ref().map_or(0_u32, TaggedAddressMode::bits)
+        | ((mte_tag << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT) & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK);
+    prctl_2args(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, config as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH
+//
+
+const PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH: c_int = 59;
+
+const PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF: usize = 0;
+
+/// Disable Syscall User Dispatch mechanism.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as
+/// detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn disable_syscall_user_dispatch() -> io::Result<()> {
+    prctl_2args(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+const PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON: usize = 1;
+
+/// Allow system calls to be executed.
+const SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW: u8 = 0;
+/// Block system calls from executing.
+const SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK: u8 = 1;
+
+/// Value of the fast switch flag controlling system calls user dispatch
+/// mechanism without the need to issue a syscall.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u8)]
+pub enum SysCallUserDispatchFastSwitch {
+    /// System calls are allowed to execute.
+    Allow = SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW,
+    /// System calls are blocked from executing.
+    Block = SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<u8> for SysCallUserDispatchFastSwitch {
+    type Error = io::Errno;
+
+    fn try_from(value: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW => Ok(Self::Allow),
+            SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK => Ok(Self::Block),
+            _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Enable Syscall User Dispatch mechanism.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as
+/// detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn enable_syscall_user_dispatch(
+    always_allowed_region: &[u8],
+    fast_switch_flag: &AtomicU8,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    syscalls::prctl(
+        PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,
+        PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON as *mut _,
+        always_allowed_region.as_ptr() as *mut _,
+        always_allowed_region.len() as *mut _,
+        as_ptr(fast_switch_flag) as *mut _,
+    )
+    .map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_SCHED_CORE
+//
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE: c_int = 62;
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_GET: usize = 0;
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD: u32 = 0;
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP: u32 = 1;
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP: u32 = 2;
+
+/// `PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_*`.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u32)]
+pub enum CoreSchedulingScope {
+    /// Operation will be performed for the thread.
+    Thread = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD,
+    /// Operation will be performed for all tasks in the task group of the
+    /// process.
+    ThreadGroup = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP,
+    /// Operation will be performed for all processes in the process group.
+    ProcessGroup = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<u32> for CoreSchedulingScope {
+    type Error = io::Errno;
+
+    fn try_from(value: u32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD => Ok(Self::Thread),
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP => Ok(Self::ThreadGroup),
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP => Ok(Self::ProcessGroup),
+            _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get core scheduling cookie of a process.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_GET,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_GET,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<u64> {
+    let mut value: MaybeUninit<u64> = MaybeUninit::uninit();
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_GET as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            value.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
+        )?;
+        Ok(value.assume_init())
+    }
+}
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE: usize = 1;
+
+/// Create unique core scheduling cookie.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn create_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            ptr::null_mut(),
+        )
+        .map(|_r| ())
+    }
+}
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO: usize = 2;
+
+/// Push core scheduling cookie to a process.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn push_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            ptr::null_mut(),
+        )
+        .map(|_r| ())
+    }
+}
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM: usize = 3;
+
+/// Pull core scheduling cookie from a process.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn pull_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            ptr::null_mut(),
+        )
+        .map(|_r| ())
+    }
+}