Initial vendor packages

Signed-off-by: Valentin Popov <valentin@popov.link>

7 files changed, 1612 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/clock.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/clock.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..986e1f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/clock.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+use crate::{backend, io};
+
+pub use crate::timespec::Timespec;
+
+#[cfg(not(any(
+    apple,
+    target_os = "dragonfly",
+    target_os = "espidf",
+    target_os = "freebsd", // FreeBSD 12 has clock_nanosleep, but libc targets FreeBSD 11.
+    target_os = "openbsd",
+    target_os = "redox",
+    target_os = "vita",
+    target_os = "wasi",
+)))]
+pub use crate::clockid::ClockId;
+
+/// `clock_nanosleep(id, 0, request, remain)`—Sleeps for a duration on a
+/// given clock.
+///
+/// This is `clock_nanosleep` specialized for the case of a relative sleep
+/// interval. See [`clock_nanosleep_absolute`] for absolute intervals.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [POSIX]
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [POSIX]: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_nanosleep.html
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/clock_nanosleep.2.html
+#[cfg(not(any(
+    apple,
+    target_os = "dragonfly",
+    target_os = "emscripten",
+    target_os = "espidf",
+    target_os = "freebsd", // FreeBSD 12 has clock_nanosleep, but libc targets FreeBSD 11.
+    target_os = "haiku",
+    target_os = "openbsd",
+    target_os = "redox",
+    target_os = "vita",
+    target_os = "wasi",
+)))]
+#[inline]
+pub fn clock_nanosleep_relative(id: ClockId, request: &Timespec) -> NanosleepRelativeResult {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::clock_nanosleep_relative(id, request)
+}
+
+/// `clock_nanosleep(id, TIMER_ABSTIME, request, NULL)`—Sleeps until an
+/// absolute time on a given clock.
+///
+/// This is `clock_nanosleep` specialized for the case of an absolute sleep
+/// interval. See [`clock_nanosleep_relative`] for relative intervals.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [POSIX]
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [POSIX]: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/clock_nanosleep.html
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/clock_nanosleep.2.html
+#[cfg(not(any(
+    apple,
+    target_os = "dragonfly",
+    target_os = "emscripten",
+    target_os = "espidf",
+    target_os = "freebsd", // FreeBSD 12 has clock_nanosleep, but libc targets FreeBSD 11.
+    target_os = "haiku",
+    target_os = "openbsd",
+    target_os = "redox",
+    target_os = "vita",
+    target_os = "wasi",
+)))]
+#[inline]
+pub fn clock_nanosleep_absolute(id: ClockId, request: &Timespec) -> io::Result<()> {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::clock_nanosleep_absolute(id, request)
+}
+
+/// `nanosleep(request, remain)`—Sleeps for a duration.
+///
+/// This effectively uses the system monotonic clock.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [POSIX]
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [POSIX]: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/nanosleep.html
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/nanosleep.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn nanosleep(request: &Timespec) -> NanosleepRelativeResult {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::nanosleep(request)
+}
+
+/// A return type for `nanosleep` and `clock_nanosleep_relative`.
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+#[must_use]
+pub enum NanosleepRelativeResult {
+    /// The sleep completed normally.
+    Ok,
+    /// The sleep was interrupted, the remaining time is returned.
+    Interrupted(Timespec),
+    /// An invalid time value was provided.
+    Err(io::Errno),
+}
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/futex.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/futex.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..47947c8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/futex.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+//! Linux `futex`.
+//!
+//! # Safety
+//!
+//! Futex is a very low-level mechanism for implementing concurrency
+//! primitives.
+#![allow(unsafe_code)]
+
+use crate::thread::Timespec;
+use crate::{backend, io};
+
+pub use backend::thread::futex::{FutexFlags, FutexOperation};
+
+/// `futex(uaddr, op, val, utime, uaddr2, val3)`
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux `futex` system call]
+///  - [Linux `futex` feature]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// This is a very low-level feature for implementing synchronization
+/// primitives. See the references links above.
+///
+/// [Linux `futex` system call]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/futex.2.html
+/// [Linux `futex` feature]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/futex.7.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn futex(
+    uaddr: *mut u32,
+    op: FutexOperation,
+    flags: FutexFlags,
+    val: u32,
+    utime: *const Timespec,
+    uaddr2: *mut u32,
+    val3: u32,
+) -> io::Result<usize> {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::futex(uaddr, op, flags, val, utime, uaddr2, val3)
+}
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/id.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/id.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..11193c9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/id.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
+use crate::{backend, io};
+
+pub use crate::pid::{Pid, RawPid};
+pub use crate::ugid::{Gid, RawGid, RawUid, Uid};
+
+/// `gettid()`—Returns the thread ID.
+///
+/// This returns the OS thread ID, which is not necessarily the same as the
+/// `rust::thread::Thread::id` or the pthread ID.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/gettid.2.html
+#[inline]
+#[must_use]
+pub fn gettid() -> Pid {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::gettid()
+}
+
+/// `setuid(uid)`
+///
+/// # Warning
+///
+/// This is not the setxid you are looking for… POSIX requires xids to be
+/// process granular, but on Linux they are per-thread. Thus, this call only
+/// changes the xid for the current *thread*, not the entire process even
+/// though that is in violation of the POSIX standard.
+///
+/// For details on this distinction, see the C library vs. kernel differences
+/// in the [manual page][linux_notes]. This call implements the kernel
+/// behavior.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [POSIX]
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [POSIX]: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/setuid.html
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html
+/// [linux_notes]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setuid.2.html#NOTES
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_thread_uid(uid: Uid) -> io::Result<()> {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::setuid_thread(uid)
+}
+
+/// `setresuid(ruid, euid, suid)`
+///
+/// # Warning
+///
+/// This is not the setresxid you are looking for… POSIX requires xids to be
+/// process granular, but on Linux they are per-thread. Thus, this call only
+/// changes the xid for the current *thread*, not the entire process even
+/// though that is in violation of the POSIX standard.
+///
+/// For details on this distinction, see the C library vs. kernel differences
+/// in the [manual page][linux_notes] and the notes in [`set_thread_uid`]. This
+/// call implements the kernel behavior.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setresuid.2.html
+/// [linux_notes]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setresuid.2.html#NOTES
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_thread_res_uid(ruid: Uid, euid: Uid, suid: Uid) -> io::Result<()> {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::setresuid_thread(ruid, euid, suid)
+}
+
+/// `setgid(gid)`
+///
+/// # Warning
+///
+/// This is not the setxid you are looking for… POSIX requires xids to be
+/// process granular, but on Linux they are per-thread. Thus, this call only
+/// changes the xid for the current *thread*, not the entire process even
+/// though that is in violation of the POSIX standard.
+///
+/// For details on this distinction, see the C library vs. kernel differences
+/// in the [manual page][linux_notes]. This call implements the kernel
+/// behavior.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [POSIX]
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [POSIX]: https://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/setgid.html
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setgid.2.html
+/// [linux_notes]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setgid.2.html#NOTES
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_thread_gid(gid: Gid) -> io::Result<()> {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::setgid_thread(gid)
+}
+
+/// `setresgid(rgid, egid, sgid)`
+///
+/// # Warning
+///
+/// This is not the setresxid you are looking for… POSIX requires xids to be
+/// process granular, but on Linux they are per-thread. Thus, this call only
+/// changes the xid for the current *thread*, not the entire process even
+/// though that is in violation of the POSIX standard.
+///
+/// For details on this distinction, see the C library vs. kernel differences
+/// in the [manual page][linux_notes] and the notes in [`set_thread_gid`]. This
+/// call implements the kernel behavior.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setresgid.2.html
+/// [linux_notes]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setresgid.2.html#NOTES
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_thread_res_gid(rgid: Gid, egid: Gid, sgid: Gid) -> io::Result<()> {
+    backend::thread::syscalls::setresgid_thread(rgid, egid, sgid)
+}
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/libcap.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/libcap.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0a0fbb4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/libcap.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+use bitflags::bitflags;
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+
+use crate::pid::Pid;
+use crate::{backend, io};
+
+/// `__user_cap_data_struct`
+#[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub struct CapabilitySets {
+    /// `__user_cap_data_struct.effective`
+    pub effective: CapabilityFlags,
+    /// `__user_cap_data_struct.permitted`
+    pub permitted: CapabilityFlags,
+    /// `__user_cap_data_struct.inheritable`
+    pub inheritable: CapabilityFlags,
+}
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// `CAP_*` constants.
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct CapabilityFlags: u64 {
+        /// `CAP_CHOWN`
+        const CHOWN = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHOWN;
+        /// `CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE`
+        const DAC_OVERRIDE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE;
+        /// `CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH`
+        const DAC_READ_SEARCH = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH;
+        /// `CAP_FOWNER`
+        const FOWNER = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FOWNER;
+        /// `CAP_FSETID`
+        const FSETID = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FSETID;
+        /// `CAP_KILL`
+        const KILL = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_KILL;
+        /// `CAP_SETGID`
+        const SETGID = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETGID;
+        /// `CAP_SETUID`
+        const SETUID = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETUID;
+        /// `CAP_SETPCAP`
+        const SETPCAP = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETPCAP;
+        /// `CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE`
+        const LINUX_IMMUTABLE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE;
+        /// `CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE`
+        const NET_BIND_SERVICE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE;
+        /// `CAP_NET_BROADCAST`
+        const NET_BROADCAST = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BROADCAST;
+        /// `CAP_NET_ADMIN`
+        const NET_ADMIN = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_ADMIN;
+        /// `CAP_NET_RAW`
+        const NET_RAW = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_RAW;
+        /// `CAP_IPC_LOCK`
+        const IPC_LOCK = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_LOCK;
+        /// `CAP_IPC_OWNER`
+        const IPC_OWNER = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_OWNER;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_MODULE`
+        const SYS_MODULE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_MODULE;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_RAWIO`
+        const SYS_RAWIO = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RAWIO;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_CHROOT`
+        const SYS_CHROOT = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_CHROOT;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_PTRACE`
+        const SYS_PTRACE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PTRACE;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_PACCT`
+        const SYS_PACCT = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PACCT;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`
+        const SYS_ADMIN = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_ADMIN;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_BOOT`
+        const SYS_BOOT = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_BOOT;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_NICE`
+        const SYS_NICE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_NICE;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_RESOURCE`
+        const SYS_RESOURCE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RESOURCE;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_TIME`
+        const SYS_TIME = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TIME;
+        /// `CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG`
+        const SYS_TTY_CONFIG = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG;
+        /// `CAP_MKNOD`
+        const MKNOD = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MKNOD;
+        /// `CAP_LEASE`
+        const LEASE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LEASE;
+        /// `CAP_AUDIT_WRITE`
+        const AUDIT_WRITE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_WRITE;
+        /// `CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL`
+        const AUDIT_CONTROL = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL;
+        /// `CAP_SETFCAP`
+        const SETFCAP = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETFCAP;
+        /// `CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE`
+        const MAC_OVERRIDE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE;
+        /// `CAP_MAC_ADMIN`
+        const MAC_ADMIN = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_ADMIN;
+        /// `CAP_SYSLOG`
+        const SYSLOG = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYSLOG;
+        /// `CAP_WAKE_ALARM`
+        const WAKE_ALARM = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_WAKE_ALARM;
+        /// `CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND`
+        const BLOCK_SUSPEND = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND;
+        /// `CAP_AUDIT_READ`
+        const AUDIT_READ = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_READ;
+        /// `CAP_PERFMON`
+        const PERFMON = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_PERFMON;
+        /// `CAP_BPF`
+        const BPF = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BPF;
+        /// `CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE`
+        const CHECKPOINT_RESTORE = 1 << linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// `capget(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, pid)`
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/capget.2.html
+#[inline]
+#[doc(alias = "capget")]
+pub fn capabilities(pid: Option<Pid>) -> io::Result<CapabilitySets> {
+    capget(pid)
+}
+
+/// `capset(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3, pid, effective, permitted,
+/// inheritable)`
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/capget.2.html
+#[inline]
+#[doc(alias = "capset")]
+pub fn set_capabilities(pid: Option<Pid>, sets: CapabilitySets) -> io::Result<()> {
+    capset(pid, sets)
+}
+
+#[inline]
+#[allow(unsafe_code)]
+fn capget(pid: Option<Pid>) -> io::Result<CapabilitySets> {
+    let mut data = [MaybeUninit::<linux_raw_sys::general::__user_cap_data_struct>::uninit(); 2];
+
+    let data = {
+        let mut header = linux_raw_sys::general::__user_cap_header_struct {
+            version: linux_raw_sys::general::_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3,
+            pid: Pid::as_raw(pid) as backend::c::c_int,
+        };
+
+        backend::thread::syscalls::capget(&mut header, &mut data)?;
+        // SAFETY: v3 is a 64-bit implementation, so the kernel filled in both
+        // data structs.
+        unsafe { (data[0].assume_init(), data[1].assume_init()) }
+    };
+
+    let effective = u64::from(data.0.effective) | (u64::from(data.1.effective) << u32::BITS);
+    let permitted = u64::from(data.0.permitted) | (u64::from(data.1.permitted) << u32::BITS);
+    let inheritable = u64::from(data.0.inheritable) | (u64::from(data.1.inheritable) << u32::BITS);
+
+    // The kernel returns a partitioned bitset that we just combined above.
+    Ok(CapabilitySets {
+        effective: CapabilityFlags::from_bits_retain(effective),
+        permitted: CapabilityFlags::from_bits_retain(permitted),
+        inheritable: CapabilityFlags::from_bits_retain(inheritable),
+    })
+}
+
+#[inline]
+fn capset(pid: Option<Pid>, sets: CapabilitySets) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let mut header = linux_raw_sys::general::__user_cap_header_struct {
+        version: linux_raw_sys::general::_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION_3,
+        pid: Pid::as_raw(pid) as backend::c::c_int,
+    };
+    let data = [
+        linux_raw_sys::general::__user_cap_data_struct {
+            effective: sets.effective.bits() as u32,
+            permitted: sets.permitted.bits() as u32,
+            inheritable: sets.inheritable.bits() as u32,
+        },
+        linux_raw_sys::general::__user_cap_data_struct {
+            effective: (sets.effective.bits() >> u32::BITS) as u32,
+            permitted: (sets.permitted.bits() >> u32::BITS) as u32,
+            inheritable: (sets.inheritable.bits() >> u32::BITS) as u32,
+        },
+    ];
+
+    backend::thread::syscalls::capset(&mut header, &data)
+}
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/mod.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/mod.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6f19635
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/mod.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+//! Thread-associated operations.
+
+#[cfg(not(target_os = "redox"))]
+mod clock;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+mod futex;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+mod id;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+mod libcap;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+mod prctl;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+mod setns;
+
+#[cfg(not(target_os = "redox"))]
+pub use clock::*;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+pub use futex::{futex, FutexFlags, FutexOperation};
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+pub use id::{
+    gettid, set_thread_gid, set_thread_res_gid, set_thread_res_uid, set_thread_uid, Gid, Pid,
+    RawGid, RawPid, RawUid, Uid,
+};
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+pub use libcap::{capabilities, set_capabilities, CapabilityFlags, CapabilitySets};
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+pub use prctl::*;
+#[cfg(linux_kernel)]
+pub use setns::*;
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9d9e6b2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,1007 @@
+//! Linux `prctl` wrappers.
+//!
+//! Rustix wraps variadic/dynamic-dispatch functions like `prctl` in
+//! type-safe wrappers.
+//!
+//! # Safety
+//!
+//! The inner `prctl` calls are dynamically typed and must be called
+//! correctly.
+#![allow(unsafe_code)]
+
+use core::mem::MaybeUninit;
+use core::num::NonZeroU64;
+use core::ptr;
+use core::ptr::NonNull;
+use core::sync::atomic::AtomicU8;
+
+use bitflags::bitflags;
+
+use crate::backend::c::{c_int, c_uint, c_void};
+use crate::backend::prctl::syscalls;
+use crate::ffi::CStr;
+#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
+use crate::ffi::CString;
+use crate::io;
+use crate::pid::Pid;
+use crate::prctl::{
+    prctl_1arg, prctl_2args, prctl_3args, prctl_get_at_arg2_optional, PointerAuthenticationKeys,
+};
+use crate::utils::as_ptr;
+
+//
+// PR_GET_KEEPCAPS/PR_SET_KEEPCAPS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: c_int = 7;
+
+/// Get the current state of the calling thread's `keep capabilities` flag.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_keep_capabilities() -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: c_int = 8;
+
+/// Set the state of the calling thread's `keep capabilities` flag.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_keep_capabilities(enable: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, usize::from(enable) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_NAME/PR_SET_NAME
+//
+
+#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
+const PR_GET_NAME: c_int = 16;
+
+/// Get the name of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_NAME,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_NAME,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+#[cfg(feature = "alloc")]
+pub fn name() -> io::Result<CString> {
+    let mut buffer = [0_u8; 16];
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_GET_NAME, buffer.as_mut_ptr().cast())? };
+
+    let len = buffer.iter().position(|&x| x == 0_u8).unwrap_or(0);
+    CString::new(&buffer[..len]).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::ILSEQ)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_NAME: c_int = 15;
+
+/// Set the name of the calling thread.
+///
+/// Unlike `pthread_setname_np`, this function silently truncates the name to
+/// 16 bytes, as the Linux syscall does.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_NAME,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_NAME,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_name(name: &CStr) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_NAME, name.as_ptr() as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_SECCOMP/PR_SET_SECCOMP
+//
+
+//const PR_GET_SECCOMP: c_int = 21;
+
+const SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED: i32 = 0;
+const SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: i32 = 1;
+const SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: i32 = 2;
+
+/// `SECCOMP_MODE_*`.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(i32)]
+pub enum SecureComputingMode {
+    /// Secure computing is not in use.
+    Disabled = SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED,
+    /// Use hard-coded filter.
+    Strict = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT,
+    /// Use user-supplied filter.
+    Filter = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<i32> for SecureComputingMode {
+    type Error = io::Errno;
+
+    fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED => Ok(Self::Disabled),
+            SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT => Ok(Self::Strict),
+            SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER => Ok(Self::Filter),
+            _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/*
+/// Get the secure computing mode of the calling thread.
+///
+/// If the caller is not in secure computing mode, this returns
+/// [`SecureComputingMode::Disabled`]. If the caller is in strict secure
+/// computing mode, then this call will cause a [`Signal::Kill`] signal to be
+/// sent to the process. If the caller is in filter mode, and this system call
+/// is allowed by the seccomp filters, it returns
+/// [`SecureComputingMode::Filter`]; otherwise, the process is killed with a
+/// [`Signal::Kill`] signal.
+///
+/// Since Linux 3.8, the Seccomp field of the `/proc/[pid]/status` file
+/// provides a method of obtaining the same information, without the risk that
+/// the process is killed; see [the `proc` manual page].
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+/// [the `proc` manual page]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc.5.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn secure_computing_mode() -> io::Result<SecureComputingMode> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_SECCOMP) }.and_then(TryInto::try_into)
+}
+*/
+
+const PR_SET_SECCOMP: c_int = 22;
+
+/// Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread, to limit the
+/// available system calls.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_secure_computing_mode(mode: SecureComputingMode) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_SECCOMP, mode as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_CAPBSET_READ/PR_CAPBSET_DROP
+//
+
+const PR_CAPBSET_READ: c_int = 23;
+
+/// Linux per-thread capability.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u32)]
+pub enum Capability {
+    /// In a system with the `_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED` option defined, this
+    /// overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group
+    /// ownership.
+    ChangeOwnership = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHOWN,
+    /// Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if `_POSIX_ACL`
+    /// is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by
+    /// [`Capability::LinuxImmutable`].
+    DACOverride = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,
+    /// Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files and
+    /// directories, including ACL restrictions if `_POSIX_ACL` is defined.
+    /// Excluding DAC access covered by [`Capability::LinuxImmutable`].
+    DACReadSearch = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
+    /// Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where
+    /// file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where
+    /// [`Capability::FileSetID`] is applicable. It doesn't override MAC
+    /// and DAC restrictions.
+    FileOwner = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FOWNER,
+    /// Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID shall
+    /// match the file owner ID when setting the `S_ISUID` and `S_ISGID`
+    /// bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the
+    /// supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting the
+    /// `S_ISGID` bit on that file; that the `S_ISUID` and `S_ISGID` bits are
+    /// cleared on successful return from `chown` (not implemented).
+    FileSetID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FSETID,
+    /// Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a
+    /// process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID of
+    /// the process receiving the signal.
+    Kill = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_KILL,
+    /// Allows `setgid` manipulation. Allows `setgroups`. Allows forged gids on
+    /// socket credentials passing.
+    SetGroupID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETGID,
+    /// Allows `set*uid` manipulation (including fsuid). Allows forged pids on
+    /// socket credentials passing.
+    SetUserID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETUID,
+    /// Without VFS support for capabilities:
+    ///  - Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid.
+    ///  - remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid. With VFS
+    ///    support for capabilities (neither of above, but)
+    ///  - Add any capability from current's capability bounding set to the
+    ///    current process' inheritable set.
+    ///  - Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set.
+    ///  - Allow modification of the securebits for a process.
+    SetPermittedCapabilities = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETPCAP,
+    /// Allow modification of `S_IMMUTABLE` and `S_APPEND` file attributes.
+    LinuxImmutable = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE,
+    /// Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024. Allows binding to ATM
+    /// VCIs below 32.
+    NetBindService = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE,
+    /// Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast.
+    NetBroadcast = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BROADCAST,
+    /// Allow interface configuration. Allow administration of IP firewall,
+    /// masquerading and accounting. Allow setting debug option on sockets.
+    /// Allow modification of routing tables. Allow setting arbitrary
+    /// process / process group ownership on sockets. Allow binding to any
+    /// address for transparent proxying (also via [`Capability::NetRaw`]).
+    /// Allow setting TOS (type of service). Allow setting promiscuous
+    /// mode. Allow clearing driver statistics. Allow multicasting. Allow
+    /// read/write of device-specific registers. Allow activation of ATM
+    /// control sockets.
+    NetAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_ADMIN,
+    /// Allow use of `RAW` sockets. Allow use of `PACKET` sockets. Allow
+    /// binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via
+    /// [`Capability::NetAdmin`]).
+    NetRaw = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_RAW,
+    /// Allow locking of shared memory segments. Allow mlock and mlockall
+    /// (which doesn't really have anything to do with IPC).
+    IPCLock = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_LOCK,
+    /// Override IPC ownership checks.
+    IPCOwner = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_OWNER,
+    /// Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit.
+    SystemModule = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_MODULE,
+    /// Allow ioperm/iopl access. Allow sending USB messages to any device via
+    /// `/dev/bus/usb`.
+    SystemRawIO = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RAWIO,
+    /// Allow use of `chroot`.
+    SystemChangeRoot = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_CHROOT,
+    /// Allow `ptrace` of any process.
+    SystemProcessTrace = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PTRACE,
+    /// Allow configuration of process accounting.
+    SystemProcessAccounting = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PACCT,
+    /// Allow configuration of the secure attention key. Allow administration
+    /// of the random device. Allow examination and configuration of disk
+    /// quotas. Allow setting the domainname. Allow setting the hostname.
+    /// Allow `mount` and `umount`, setting up new smb connection.
+    /// Allow some autofs root ioctls. Allow nfsservctl. Allow
+    /// `VM86_REQUEST_IRQ`. Allow to read/write pci config on alpha. Allow
+    /// `irix_prctl` on mips (setstacksize). Allow flushing all cache on
+    /// m68k (`sys_cacheflush`). Allow removing semaphores. Used instead of
+    /// [`Capability::ChangeOwnership`] to "chown" IPC message queues,
+    /// semaphores and shared memory. Allow locking/unlocking of shared
+    /// memory segment. Allow turning swap on/off. Allow forged pids on
+    /// socket credentials passing. Allow setting readahead and
+    /// flushing buffers on block devices. Allow setting geometry in floppy
+    /// driver. Allow turning DMA on/off in `xd` driver. Allow
+    /// administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some
+    /// extra ioctls). Allow tuning the ide driver. Allow access to the nvram
+    /// device. Allow administration of `apm_bios`, serial and bttv (TV)
+    /// device. Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver.
+    /// Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space.
+    /// Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver. Allow setting up serial ports.
+    /// Allow sending raw qic-117 commands. Allow enabling/disabling tagged
+    /// queuing on SCSI controllers and sending arbitrary SCSI commands.
+    /// Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem. Allow setting
+    /// zone reclaim policy. Allow everything under
+    /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] and
+    /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] for backward compatibility.
+    SystemAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_ADMIN,
+    /// Allow use of `reboot`.
+    SystemBoot = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_BOOT,
+    /// Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different UID)
+    /// processes. Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling
+    /// on own processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by
+    /// another process. Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes.
+    /// Allow setting realtime ioprio class. Allow setting ioprio class on
+    /// other processes.
+    SystemNice = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_NICE,
+    /// Override resource limits. Set resource limits. Override quota limits.
+    /// Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem. Modify data journaling
+    /// mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling resources). NOTE: ext2
+    /// honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so you can
+    /// override using fsuid too. Override size restrictions on IPC message
+    /// queues. Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock.
+    /// Override max number of consoles on console allocation. Override max
+    /// number of keymaps. Control memory reclaim behavior.
+    SystemResource = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RESOURCE,
+    /// Allow manipulation of system clock. Allow `irix_stime` on mips. Allow
+    /// setting the real-time clock.
+    SystemTime = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TIME,
+    /// Allow configuration of tty devices. Allow `vhangup` of tty.
+    SystemTTYConfig = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG,
+    /// Allow the privileged aspects of `mknod`.
+    MakeNode = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MKNOD,
+    /// Allow taking of leases on files.
+    Lease = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LEASE,
+    /// Allow writing the audit log via unicast netlink socket.
+    AuditWrite = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_WRITE,
+    /// Allow configuration of audit via unicast netlink socket.
+    AuditControl = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL,
+    /// Set or remove capabilities on files. Map `uid=0` into a child user
+    /// namespace.
+    SetFileCapabilities = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETFCAP,
+    /// Override MAC access. The base kernel enforces no MAC policy. An LSM may
+    /// enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses to implement
+    /// capability based overrides of that policy, this is the capability
+    /// it should use to do so.
+    MACOverride = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,
+    /// Allow MAC configuration or state changes. The base kernel requires no
+    /// MAC configuration. An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does
+    /// and it chooses to implement capability based
+    /// checks on modifications to that policy or the data required to maintain
+    /// it, this is the capability it should use to do so.
+    MACAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_ADMIN,
+    /// Allow configuring the kernel's `syslog` (`printk` behaviour).
+    SystemLog = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYSLOG,
+    /// Allow triggering something that will wake the system.
+    WakeAlarm = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_WAKE_ALARM,
+    /// Allow preventing system suspends.
+    BlockSuspend = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND,
+    /// Allow reading the audit log via multicast netlink socket.
+    AuditRead = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_READ,
+    /// Allow system performance and observability privileged operations using
+    /// `perf_events`, `i915_perf` and other kernel subsystems.
+    PerformanceMonitoring = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_PERFMON,
+    /// This capability allows the following BPF operations:
+    ///  - Creating all types of BPF maps
+    ///  - Advanced verifier features
+    ///     - Indirect variable access
+    ///     - Bounded loops
+    ///     - BPF to BPF function calls
+    ///     - Scalar precision tracking
+    ///     - Larger complexity limits
+    ///     - Dead code elimination
+    ///     - And potentially other features
+    ///  - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data
+    ///  - Retrieve `xlated` and JITed code of BPF programs
+    ///  - Use `bpf_spin_lock` helper
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] relaxes the verifier checks
+    /// further:
+    ///  - BPF progs can use of pointer-to-integer conversions
+    ///  - speculation attack hardening measures are bypassed
+    ///  - `bpf_probe_read` to read arbitrary kernel memory is allowed
+    ///  - `bpf_trace_printk` to print kernel memory is allowed
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::SystemAdmin`] is required to use bpf_probe_write_user.
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::SystemAdmin`] is required to iterate system-wide loaded
+    /// programs, maps, links, and BTFs, and convert their IDs to file
+    /// descriptors.
+    ///
+    /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] and
+    /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] are required to load tracing
+    /// programs. [`Capability::NetAdmin`] and
+    /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] are required to load
+    /// networking programs.
+    BerkeleyPacketFilters = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BPF,
+    /// Allow checkpoint/restore related operations. Allow PID selection during
+    /// `clone3`. Allow writing to `ns_last_pid`.
+    CheckpointRestore = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE,
+}
+
+/// Check if the specified capability is in the calling thread's capability
+/// bounding set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn capability_is_in_bounding_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAPBSET_READ, capability as usize as *mut _) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_CAPBSET_DROP: c_int = 24;
+
+/// If the calling thread has the [`Capability::SetPermittedCapabilities`]
+/// capability within its user namespace, then drop the specified capability
+/// from the thread's capability bounding set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn remove_capability_from_bounding_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, capability as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_SECUREBITS/PR_SET_SECUREBITS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_SECUREBITS: c_int = 27;
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// `SECBIT_*`.
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct CapabilitiesSecureBits: u32 {
+        /// If this bit is set, then the kernel does not grant capabilities
+        /// when a `set-user-ID-root` program is executed, or when a process
+        /// with an effective or real UID of 0 calls `execve`.
+        const NO_ROOT = 1_u32 << 0;
+        /// Set [`NO_ROOT`] irreversibly.
+        const NO_ROOT_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 1;
+        /// Setting this flag stops the kernel from adjusting the process'
+        /// permitted, effective, and ambient capability sets when the thread's
+        /// effective and filesystem UIDs are switched between zero and nonzero
+        /// values.
+        const NO_SETUID_FIXUP = 1_u32 << 2;
+        /// Set [`NO_SETUID_FIXUP`] irreversibly.
+        const NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 3;
+        /// Setting this flag allows a thread that has one or more 0 UIDs to
+        /// retain capabilities in its permitted set when it switches all of
+        /// its UIDs to nonzero values.
+        const KEEP_CAPS = 1_u32 << 4;
+        /// Set [`KEEP_CAPS`] irreversibly.
+        const KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 5;
+        /// Setting this flag disallows raising ambient capabilities via the
+        /// `prctl`'s `PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE` operation.
+        const NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE = 1_u32 << 6;
+        /// Set [`NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE`] irreversibly.
+        const NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 7;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get the `securebits` flags of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn capabilities_secure_bits() -> io::Result<CapabilitiesSecureBits> {
+    let r = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)? } as c_uint;
+    CapabilitiesSecureBits::from_bits(r).ok_or(io::Errno::RANGE)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_SECUREBITS: c_int = 28;
+
+/// Set the `securebits` flags of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_capabilities_secure_bits(bits: CapabilitiesSecureBits) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits.bits() as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_TIMERSLACK/PR_SET_TIMERSLACK
+//
+
+const PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: c_int = 30;
+
+/// Get the `current` timer slack value of the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn current_timer_slack() -> io::Result<u64> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK) }.map(|r| r as u64)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: c_int = 29;
+
+/// Sets the `current` timer slack value for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_current_timer_slack(value: Option<NonZeroU64>) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let value = usize::try_from(value.map_or(0, NonZeroU64::get)).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::RANGE)?;
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, value as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS/PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: c_int = 39;
+
+/// Get the value of the `no_new_privs` attribute for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn no_new_privs() -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: c_int = 38;
+
+/// Set the calling thread's `no_new_privs` attribute.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn set_no_new_privs(no_new_privs: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, usize::from(no_new_privs) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS
+//
+
+const PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: c_int = 40;
+
+/// Get the `clear_child_tid` address set by `set_tid_address`
+/// and `clone`'s `CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID` flag.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn get_clear_child_tid_address() -> io::Result<Option<NonNull<c_void>>> {
+    unsafe { prctl_get_at_arg2_optional::<*mut c_void>(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS) }.map(NonNull::new)
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_THP_DISABLE/PR_SET_THP_DISABLE
+//
+
+const PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: c_int = 42;
+
+/// Get the current setting of the `THP disable` flag for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn transparent_huge_pages_are_disabled() -> io::Result<bool> {
+    unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: c_int = 41;
+
+/// Set the state of the `THP disable` flag for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn disable_transparent_huge_pages(thp_disable: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, usize::from(thp_disable) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_CAP_AMBIENT
+//
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT: c_int = 47;
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET: usize = 1;
+
+/// Check if the specified capability is in the ambient set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn capability_is_in_ambient_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<bool> {
+    let cap = capability as usize as *mut _;
+    unsafe { prctl_3args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET as *mut _, cap) }.map(|r| r != 0)
+}
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL: usize = 4;
+
+/// Remove all capabilities from the ambient set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn clear_ambient_capability_set() -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE: usize = 2;
+const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER: usize = 3;
+
+/// Add or remove the specified capability to the ambient set.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn configure_capability_in_ambient_set(capability: Capability, enable: bool) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let sub_operation = if enable {
+        PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
+    } else {
+        PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER
+    };
+    let cap = capability as usize as *mut _;
+
+    unsafe { prctl_3args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, sub_operation as *mut _, cap) }.map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_SVE_GET_VL/PR_SVE_SET_VL
+//
+
+const PR_SVE_GET_VL: c_int = 51;
+
+const PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK: u32 = 0xffff;
+const PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT: u32 = 1_u32 << 17;
+
+/// Scalable Vector Extension vector length configuration.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+pub struct SVEVectorLengthConfig {
+    /// Vector length in bytes.
+    pub vector_length_in_bytes: u32,
+    /// Vector length inherited across `execve`.
+    pub vector_length_inherited_across_execve: bool,
+}
+
+/// Get the thread's current SVE vector length configuration.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SVE_GET_VL,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SVE_GET_VL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn sve_vector_length_configuration() -> io::Result<SVEVectorLengthConfig> {
+    let bits = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_SVE_GET_VL)? } as c_uint;
+    Ok(SVEVectorLengthConfig {
+        vector_length_in_bytes: bits & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK,
+        vector_length_inherited_across_execve: (bits & PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT) != 0,
+    })
+}
+
+const PR_SVE_SET_VL: c_int = 50;
+
+const PR_SVE_SET_VL_ONEXEC: u32 = 1_u32 << 18;
+
+/// Configure the thread's vector length of Scalable Vector Extension.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SVE_SET_VL,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function,
+/// as detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SVE_SET_VL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn set_sve_vector_length_configuration(
+    vector_length_in_bytes: usize,
+    vector_length_inherited_across_execve: bool,
+    defer_change_to_next_execve: bool,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let vector_length_in_bytes =
+        u32::try_from(vector_length_in_bytes).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::RANGE)?;
+
+    let mut bits = vector_length_in_bytes & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK;
+
+    if vector_length_inherited_across_execve {
+        bits |= PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT;
+    }
+
+    if defer_change_to_next_execve {
+        bits |= PR_SVE_SET_VL_ONEXEC;
+    }
+
+    prctl_2args(PR_SVE_SET_VL, bits as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS
+//
+
+const PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: c_int = 54;
+
+/// Securely reset the thread's pointer authentication keys to fresh random
+/// values generated by the kernel.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function,
+/// as detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn reset_pointer_authentication_keys(
+    keys: Option<PointerAuthenticationKeys>,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let keys = keys.as_ref().map_or(0_u32, PointerAuthenticationKeys::bits);
+    prctl_2args(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS, keys as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL/PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL
+//
+
+const PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: c_int = 56;
+
+const PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT: u32 = 3;
+const PR_MTE_TAG_MASK: u32 = 0xffff_u32 << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT;
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// Zero means addresses that are passed for the purpose of being
+    /// dereferenced by the kernel must be untagged.
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct TaggedAddressMode: u32 {
+        /// Addresses that are passed for the purpose of being dereferenced by
+        /// the kernel may be tagged.
+        const ENABLED = 1_u32 << 0;
+        /// Synchronous tag check fault mode.
+        const TCF_SYNC = 1_u32 << 1;
+        /// Asynchronous tag check fault mode.
+        const TCF_ASYNC = 1_u32 << 2;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get the current tagged address mode for the calling thread.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn current_tagged_address_mode() -> io::Result<(Option<TaggedAddressMode>, u32)> {
+    let r = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL)? } as c_uint;
+    let mode = r & 0b111_u32;
+    let mte_tag = (r & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK) >> PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT;
+    Ok((TaggedAddressMode::from_bits(mode), mte_tag))
+}
+
+const PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: c_int = 55;
+
+/// Controls support for passing tagged user-space addresses to the kernel.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as
+/// detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn set_current_tagged_address_mode(
+    mode: Option<TaggedAddressMode>,
+    mte_tag: u32,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let config = mode.as_ref().map_or(0_u32, TaggedAddressMode::bits)
+        | ((mte_tag << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT) & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK);
+    prctl_2args(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, config as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH
+//
+
+const PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH: c_int = 59;
+
+const PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF: usize = 0;
+
+/// Disable Syscall User Dispatch mechanism.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as
+/// detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn disable_syscall_user_dispatch() -> io::Result<()> {
+    prctl_2args(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF as *mut _).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+const PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON: usize = 1;
+
+/// Allow system calls to be executed.
+const SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW: u8 = 0;
+/// Block system calls from executing.
+const SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK: u8 = 1;
+
+/// Value of the fast switch flag controlling system calls user dispatch
+/// mechanism without the need to issue a syscall.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u8)]
+pub enum SysCallUserDispatchFastSwitch {
+    /// System calls are allowed to execute.
+    Allow = SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW,
+    /// System calls are blocked from executing.
+    Block = SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<u8> for SysCallUserDispatchFastSwitch {
+    type Error = io::Errno;
+
+    fn try_from(value: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW => Ok(Self::Allow),
+            SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK => Ok(Self::Block),
+            _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Enable Syscall User Dispatch mechanism.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON,...)`]
+///
+/// # Safety
+///
+/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as
+/// detailed in the references above.
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html
+#[inline]
+pub unsafe fn enable_syscall_user_dispatch(
+    always_allowed_region: &[u8],
+    fast_switch_flag: &AtomicU8,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    syscalls::prctl(
+        PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,
+        PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON as *mut _,
+        always_allowed_region.as_ptr() as *mut _,
+        always_allowed_region.len() as *mut _,
+        as_ptr(fast_switch_flag) as *mut _,
+    )
+    .map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+//
+// PR_SCHED_CORE
+//
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE: c_int = 62;
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_GET: usize = 0;
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD: u32 = 0;
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP: u32 = 1;
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP: u32 = 2;
+
+/// `PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_*`.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u32)]
+pub enum CoreSchedulingScope {
+    /// Operation will be performed for the thread.
+    Thread = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD,
+    /// Operation will be performed for all tasks in the task group of the
+    /// process.
+    ThreadGroup = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP,
+    /// Operation will be performed for all processes in the process group.
+    ProcessGroup = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP,
+}
+
+impl TryFrom<u32> for CoreSchedulingScope {
+    type Error = io::Errno;
+
+    fn try_from(value: u32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> {
+        match value {
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD => Ok(Self::Thread),
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP => Ok(Self::ThreadGroup),
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP => Ok(Self::ProcessGroup),
+            _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE),
+        }
+    }
+}
+
+/// Get core scheduling cookie of a process.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_GET,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_GET,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<u64> {
+    let mut value: MaybeUninit<u64> = MaybeUninit::uninit();
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_GET as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            value.as_mut_ptr().cast(),
+        )?;
+        Ok(value.assume_init())
+    }
+}
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE: usize = 1;
+
+/// Create unique core scheduling cookie.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn create_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            ptr::null_mut(),
+        )
+        .map(|_r| ())
+    }
+}
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO: usize = 2;
+
+/// Push core scheduling cookie to a process.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn push_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            ptr::null_mut(),
+        )
+        .map(|_r| ())
+    }
+}
+
+const PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM: usize = 3;
+
+/// Pull core scheduling cookie from a process.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM,...)`]
+///
+/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html
+#[inline]
+pub fn pull_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> {
+    unsafe {
+        syscalls::prctl(
+            PR_SCHED_CORE,
+            PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM as *mut _,
+            pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _,
+            scope as usize as *mut _,
+            ptr::null_mut(),
+        )
+        .map(|_r| ())
+    }
+}
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/setns.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/setns.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef61d11
--- /dev/null
+++ b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/setns.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+use bitflags::bitflags;
+use linux_raw_sys::general::{
+    CLONE_FILES, CLONE_FS, CLONE_NEWCGROUP, CLONE_NEWIPC, CLONE_NEWNET, CLONE_NEWNS, CLONE_NEWPID,
+    CLONE_NEWTIME, CLONE_NEWUSER, CLONE_NEWUTS, CLONE_SYSVSEM,
+};
+
+use crate::backend::c::c_int;
+use crate::backend::thread::syscalls;
+use crate::fd::BorrowedFd;
+use crate::io;
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// Thread name space type.
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct ThreadNameSpaceType: u32 {
+        /// Time name space.
+        const TIME = CLONE_NEWTIME;
+        /// Mount name space.
+        const MOUNT = CLONE_NEWNS;
+        /// Control group (CGroup) name space.
+        const CONTROL_GROUP = CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
+        /// `Host name` and `NIS domain name` (UTS) name space.
+        const HOST_NAME_AND_NIS_DOMAIN_NAME = CLONE_NEWUTS;
+        /// Inter-process communication (IPC) name space.
+        const INTER_PROCESS_COMMUNICATION = CLONE_NEWIPC;
+        /// User name space.
+        const USER = CLONE_NEWUSER;
+        /// Process ID name space.
+        const PROCESS_ID = CLONE_NEWPID;
+        /// Network name space.
+        const NETWORK = CLONE_NEWNET;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Type of name space referred to by a link.
+#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)]
+#[repr(u32)]
+pub enum LinkNameSpaceType {
+    /// Time name space.
+    Time = CLONE_NEWTIME,
+    /// Mount name space.
+    Mount = CLONE_NEWNS,
+    /// Control group (CGroup) name space.
+    ControlGroup = CLONE_NEWCGROUP,
+    /// `Host name` and `NIS domain name` (UTS) name space.
+    HostNameAndNISDomainName = CLONE_NEWUTS,
+    /// Inter-process communication (IPC) name space.
+    InterProcessCommunication = CLONE_NEWIPC,
+    /// User name space.
+    User = CLONE_NEWUSER,
+    /// Process ID name space.
+    ProcessID = CLONE_NEWPID,
+    /// Network name space.
+    Network = CLONE_NEWNET,
+}
+
+bitflags! {
+    /// `CLONE_*` for use with [`unshare`].
+    #[repr(transparent)]
+    #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)]
+    pub struct UnshareFlags: u32 {
+        /// `CLONE_FILES`.
+        const FILES = CLONE_FILES;
+        /// `CLONE_FS`.
+        const FS = CLONE_FS;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWCGROUP`.
+        const NEWCGROUP = CLONE_NEWCGROUP;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWIPC`.
+        const NEWIPC = CLONE_NEWIPC;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWNET`.
+        const NEWNET = CLONE_NEWNET;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWNS`.
+        const NEWNS = CLONE_NEWNS;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWPID`.
+        const NEWPID = CLONE_NEWPID;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWTIME`.
+        const NEWTIME = CLONE_NEWTIME;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWUSER`.
+        const NEWUSER = CLONE_NEWUSER;
+        /// `CLONE_NEWUTS`
+        const NEWUTS = CLONE_NEWUTS;
+        /// `CLONE_SYSVSEM`.
+        const SYSVSEM = CLONE_SYSVSEM;
+
+        /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags>
+        const _ = !0;
+    }
+}
+
+/// Reassociate the calling thread with the namespace associated with link
+/// referred to by `fd`.
+///
+/// `fd` must refer to one of the magic links in a `/proc/[pid]/ns/` directory,
+/// or a bind mount to such a link.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setns.2.html
+pub fn move_into_link_name_space(
+    fd: BorrowedFd<'_>,
+    allowed_type: Option<LinkNameSpaceType>,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    let allowed_type = allowed_type.map_or(0, |t| t as c_int);
+    syscalls::setns(fd, allowed_type).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+/// Atomically move the calling thread into one or more of the same namespaces
+/// as the thread referred to by `fd`.
+///
+/// `fd` must refer to a thread ID. See: `pidfd_open` and `clone`.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/setns.2.html
+pub fn move_into_thread_name_spaces(
+    fd: BorrowedFd<'_>,
+    allowed_types: ThreadNameSpaceType,
+) -> io::Result<()> {
+    syscalls::setns(fd, allowed_types.bits() as c_int).map(|_r| ())
+}
+
+/// `unshare(flags)`—Disassociate parts of the current thread's execution
+/// context with other threads.
+///
+/// # References
+///  - [Linux]
+///
+/// [Linux]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/unshare.2.html
+pub fn unshare(flags: UnshareFlags) -> io::Result<()> {
+    syscalls::unshare(flags)
+}