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Diffstat (limited to 'vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs')
-rw-r--r-- | vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs | 1007 |
1 files changed, 0 insertions, 1007 deletions
diff --git a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs b/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs deleted file mode 100644 index 9d9e6b2..0000000 --- a/vendor/rustix/src/thread/prctl.rs +++ /dev/null @@ -1,1007 +0,0 @@ -//! Linux `prctl` wrappers. -//! -//! Rustix wraps variadic/dynamic-dispatch functions like `prctl` in -//! type-safe wrappers. -//! -//! # Safety -//! -//! The inner `prctl` calls are dynamically typed and must be called -//! correctly. -#![allow(unsafe_code)] - -use core::mem::MaybeUninit; -use core::num::NonZeroU64; -use core::ptr; -use core::ptr::NonNull; -use core::sync::atomic::AtomicU8; - -use bitflags::bitflags; - -use crate::backend::c::{c_int, c_uint, c_void}; -use crate::backend::prctl::syscalls; -use crate::ffi::CStr; -#[cfg(feature = "alloc")] -use crate::ffi::CString; -use crate::io; -use crate::pid::Pid; -use crate::prctl::{ - prctl_1arg, prctl_2args, prctl_3args, prctl_get_at_arg2_optional, PointerAuthenticationKeys, -}; -use crate::utils::as_ptr; - -// -// PR_GET_KEEPCAPS/PR_SET_KEEPCAPS -// - -const PR_GET_KEEPCAPS: c_int = 7; - -/// Get the current state of the calling thread's `keep capabilities` flag. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn get_keep_capabilities() -> io::Result<bool> { - unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_KEEPCAPS) }.map(|r| r != 0) -} - -const PR_SET_KEEPCAPS: c_int = 8; - -/// Set the state of the calling thread's `keep capabilities` flag. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn set_keep_capabilities(enable: bool) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_KEEPCAPS, usize::from(enable) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_NAME/PR_SET_NAME -// - -#[cfg(feature = "alloc")] -const PR_GET_NAME: c_int = 16; - -/// Get the name of the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_NAME,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_NAME,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -#[cfg(feature = "alloc")] -pub fn name() -> io::Result<CString> { - let mut buffer = [0_u8; 16]; - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_GET_NAME, buffer.as_mut_ptr().cast())? }; - - let len = buffer.iter().position(|&x| x == 0_u8).unwrap_or(0); - CString::new(&buffer[..len]).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::ILSEQ) -} - -const PR_SET_NAME: c_int = 15; - -/// Set the name of the calling thread. -/// -/// Unlike `pthread_setname_np`, this function silently truncates the name to -/// 16 bytes, as the Linux syscall does. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_NAME,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_NAME,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn set_name(name: &CStr) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_NAME, name.as_ptr() as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_SECCOMP/PR_SET_SECCOMP -// - -//const PR_GET_SECCOMP: c_int = 21; - -const SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED: i32 = 0; -const SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT: i32 = 1; -const SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER: i32 = 2; - -/// `SECCOMP_MODE_*`. -#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] -#[repr(i32)] -pub enum SecureComputingMode { - /// Secure computing is not in use. - Disabled = SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED, - /// Use hard-coded filter. - Strict = SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT, - /// Use user-supplied filter. - Filter = SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, -} - -impl TryFrom<i32> for SecureComputingMode { - type Error = io::Errno; - - fn try_from(value: i32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { - match value { - SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED => Ok(Self::Disabled), - SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT => Ok(Self::Strict), - SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER => Ok(Self::Filter), - _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE), - } - } -} - -/* -/// Get the secure computing mode of the calling thread. -/// -/// If the caller is not in secure computing mode, this returns -/// [`SecureComputingMode::Disabled`]. If the caller is in strict secure -/// computing mode, then this call will cause a [`Signal::Kill`] signal to be -/// sent to the process. If the caller is in filter mode, and this system call -/// is allowed by the seccomp filters, it returns -/// [`SecureComputingMode::Filter`]; otherwise, the process is killed with a -/// [`Signal::Kill`] signal. -/// -/// Since Linux 3.8, the Seccomp field of the `/proc/[pid]/status` file -/// provides a method of obtaining the same information, without the risk that -/// the process is killed; see [the `proc` manual page]. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_SECCOMP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -/// [the `proc` manual page]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man5/proc.5.html -#[inline] -pub fn secure_computing_mode() -> io::Result<SecureComputingMode> { - unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_SECCOMP) }.and_then(TryInto::try_into) -} -*/ - -const PR_SET_SECCOMP: c_int = 22; - -/// Set the secure computing mode for the calling thread, to limit the -/// available system calls. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn set_secure_computing_mode(mode: SecureComputingMode) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_SECCOMP, mode as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_CAPBSET_READ/PR_CAPBSET_DROP -// - -const PR_CAPBSET_READ: c_int = 23; - -/// Linux per-thread capability. -#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] -#[repr(u32)] -pub enum Capability { - /// In a system with the `_POSIX_CHOWN_RESTRICTED` option defined, this - /// overrides the restriction of changing file ownership and group - /// ownership. - ChangeOwnership = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHOWN, - /// Override all DAC access, including ACL execute access if `_POSIX_ACL` - /// is defined. Excluding DAC access covered by - /// [`Capability::LinuxImmutable`]. - DACOverride = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, - /// Overrides all DAC restrictions regarding read and search on files and - /// directories, including ACL restrictions if `_POSIX_ACL` is defined. - /// Excluding DAC access covered by [`Capability::LinuxImmutable`]. - DACReadSearch = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH, - /// Overrides all restrictions about allowed operations on files, where - /// file owner ID must be equal to the user ID, except where - /// [`Capability::FileSetID`] is applicable. It doesn't override MAC - /// and DAC restrictions. - FileOwner = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FOWNER, - /// Overrides the following restrictions that the effective user ID shall - /// match the file owner ID when setting the `S_ISUID` and `S_ISGID` - /// bits on that file; that the effective group ID (or one of the - /// supplementary group IDs) shall match the file owner ID when setting the - /// `S_ISGID` bit on that file; that the `S_ISUID` and `S_ISGID` bits are - /// cleared on successful return from `chown` (not implemented). - FileSetID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_FSETID, - /// Overrides the restriction that the real or effective user ID of a - /// process sending a signal must match the real or effective user ID of - /// the process receiving the signal. - Kill = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_KILL, - /// Allows `setgid` manipulation. Allows `setgroups`. Allows forged gids on - /// socket credentials passing. - SetGroupID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETGID, - /// Allows `set*uid` manipulation (including fsuid). Allows forged pids on - /// socket credentials passing. - SetUserID = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETUID, - /// Without VFS support for capabilities: - /// - Transfer any capability in your permitted set to any pid. - /// - remove any capability in your permitted set from any pid. With VFS - /// support for capabilities (neither of above, but) - /// - Add any capability from current's capability bounding set to the - /// current process' inheritable set. - /// - Allow taking bits out of capability bounding set. - /// - Allow modification of the securebits for a process. - SetPermittedCapabilities = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETPCAP, - /// Allow modification of `S_IMMUTABLE` and `S_APPEND` file attributes. - LinuxImmutable = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE, - /// Allows binding to TCP/UDP sockets below 1024. Allows binding to ATM - /// VCIs below 32. - NetBindService = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE, - /// Allow broadcasting, listen to multicast. - NetBroadcast = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_BROADCAST, - /// Allow interface configuration. Allow administration of IP firewall, - /// masquerading and accounting. Allow setting debug option on sockets. - /// Allow modification of routing tables. Allow setting arbitrary - /// process / process group ownership on sockets. Allow binding to any - /// address for transparent proxying (also via [`Capability::NetRaw`]). - /// Allow setting TOS (type of service). Allow setting promiscuous - /// mode. Allow clearing driver statistics. Allow multicasting. Allow - /// read/write of device-specific registers. Allow activation of ATM - /// control sockets. - NetAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_ADMIN, - /// Allow use of `RAW` sockets. Allow use of `PACKET` sockets. Allow - /// binding to any address for transparent proxying (also via - /// [`Capability::NetAdmin`]). - NetRaw = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_NET_RAW, - /// Allow locking of shared memory segments. Allow mlock and mlockall - /// (which doesn't really have anything to do with IPC). - IPCLock = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_LOCK, - /// Override IPC ownership checks. - IPCOwner = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_IPC_OWNER, - /// Insert and remove kernel modules - modify kernel without limit. - SystemModule = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_MODULE, - /// Allow ioperm/iopl access. Allow sending USB messages to any device via - /// `/dev/bus/usb`. - SystemRawIO = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RAWIO, - /// Allow use of `chroot`. - SystemChangeRoot = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_CHROOT, - /// Allow `ptrace` of any process. - SystemProcessTrace = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PTRACE, - /// Allow configuration of process accounting. - SystemProcessAccounting = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_PACCT, - /// Allow configuration of the secure attention key. Allow administration - /// of the random device. Allow examination and configuration of disk - /// quotas. Allow setting the domainname. Allow setting the hostname. - /// Allow `mount` and `umount`, setting up new smb connection. - /// Allow some autofs root ioctls. Allow nfsservctl. Allow - /// `VM86_REQUEST_IRQ`. Allow to read/write pci config on alpha. Allow - /// `irix_prctl` on mips (setstacksize). Allow flushing all cache on - /// m68k (`sys_cacheflush`). Allow removing semaphores. Used instead of - /// [`Capability::ChangeOwnership`] to "chown" IPC message queues, - /// semaphores and shared memory. Allow locking/unlocking of shared - /// memory segment. Allow turning swap on/off. Allow forged pids on - /// socket credentials passing. Allow setting readahead and - /// flushing buffers on block devices. Allow setting geometry in floppy - /// driver. Allow turning DMA on/off in `xd` driver. Allow - /// administration of md devices (mostly the above, but some - /// extra ioctls). Allow tuning the ide driver. Allow access to the nvram - /// device. Allow administration of `apm_bios`, serial and bttv (TV) - /// device. Allow manufacturer commands in isdn CAPI support driver. - /// Allow reading non-standardized portions of pci configuration space. - /// Allow DDI debug ioctl on sbpcd driver. Allow setting up serial ports. - /// Allow sending raw qic-117 commands. Allow enabling/disabling tagged - /// queuing on SCSI controllers and sending arbitrary SCSI commands. - /// Allow setting encryption key on loopback filesystem. Allow setting - /// zone reclaim policy. Allow everything under - /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] and - /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] for backward compatibility. - SystemAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - /// Allow use of `reboot`. - SystemBoot = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_BOOT, - /// Allow raising priority and setting priority on other (different UID) - /// processes. Allow use of FIFO and round-robin (realtime) scheduling - /// on own processes and setting the scheduling algorithm used by - /// another process. Allow setting cpu affinity on other processes. - /// Allow setting realtime ioprio class. Allow setting ioprio class on - /// other processes. - SystemNice = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_NICE, - /// Override resource limits. Set resource limits. Override quota limits. - /// Override reserved space on ext2 filesystem. Modify data journaling - /// mode on ext3 filesystem (uses journaling resources). NOTE: ext2 - /// honors fsuid when checking for resource overrides, so you can - /// override using fsuid too. Override size restrictions on IPC message - /// queues. Allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock. - /// Override max number of consoles on console allocation. Override max - /// number of keymaps. Control memory reclaim behavior. - SystemResource = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_RESOURCE, - /// Allow manipulation of system clock. Allow `irix_stime` on mips. Allow - /// setting the real-time clock. - SystemTime = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TIME, - /// Allow configuration of tty devices. Allow `vhangup` of tty. - SystemTTYConfig = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG, - /// Allow the privileged aspects of `mknod`. - MakeNode = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MKNOD, - /// Allow taking of leases on files. - Lease = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_LEASE, - /// Allow writing the audit log via unicast netlink socket. - AuditWrite = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_WRITE, - /// Allow configuration of audit via unicast netlink socket. - AuditControl = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL, - /// Set or remove capabilities on files. Map `uid=0` into a child user - /// namespace. - SetFileCapabilities = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SETFCAP, - /// Override MAC access. The base kernel enforces no MAC policy. An LSM may - /// enforce a MAC policy, and if it does and it chooses to implement - /// capability based overrides of that policy, this is the capability - /// it should use to do so. - MACOverride = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, - /// Allow MAC configuration or state changes. The base kernel requires no - /// MAC configuration. An LSM may enforce a MAC policy, and if it does - /// and it chooses to implement capability based - /// checks on modifications to that policy or the data required to maintain - /// it, this is the capability it should use to do so. - MACAdmin = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_MAC_ADMIN, - /// Allow configuring the kernel's `syslog` (`printk` behaviour). - SystemLog = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_SYSLOG, - /// Allow triggering something that will wake the system. - WakeAlarm = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_WAKE_ALARM, - /// Allow preventing system suspends. - BlockSuspend = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND, - /// Allow reading the audit log via multicast netlink socket. - AuditRead = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_AUDIT_READ, - /// Allow system performance and observability privileged operations using - /// `perf_events`, `i915_perf` and other kernel subsystems. - PerformanceMonitoring = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_PERFMON, - /// This capability allows the following BPF operations: - /// - Creating all types of BPF maps - /// - Advanced verifier features - /// - Indirect variable access - /// - Bounded loops - /// - BPF to BPF function calls - /// - Scalar precision tracking - /// - Larger complexity limits - /// - Dead code elimination - /// - And potentially other features - /// - Loading BPF Type Format (BTF) data - /// - Retrieve `xlated` and JITed code of BPF programs - /// - Use `bpf_spin_lock` helper - /// - /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] relaxes the verifier checks - /// further: - /// - BPF progs can use of pointer-to-integer conversions - /// - speculation attack hardening measures are bypassed - /// - `bpf_probe_read` to read arbitrary kernel memory is allowed - /// - `bpf_trace_printk` to print kernel memory is allowed - /// - /// [`Capability::SystemAdmin`] is required to use bpf_probe_write_user. - /// - /// [`Capability::SystemAdmin`] is required to iterate system-wide loaded - /// programs, maps, links, and BTFs, and convert their IDs to file - /// descriptors. - /// - /// [`Capability::PerformanceMonitoring`] and - /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] are required to load tracing - /// programs. [`Capability::NetAdmin`] and - /// [`Capability::BerkeleyPacketFilters`] are required to load - /// networking programs. - BerkeleyPacketFilters = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_BPF, - /// Allow checkpoint/restore related operations. Allow PID selection during - /// `clone3`. Allow writing to `ns_last_pid`. - CheckpointRestore = linux_raw_sys::general::CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE, -} - -/// Check if the specified capability is in the calling thread's capability -/// bounding set. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_READ,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn capability_is_in_bounding_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<bool> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAPBSET_READ, capability as usize as *mut _) }.map(|r| r != 0) -} - -const PR_CAPBSET_DROP: c_int = 24; - -/// If the calling thread has the [`Capability::SetPermittedCapabilities`] -/// capability within its user namespace, then drop the specified capability -/// from the thread's capability bounding set. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_CAPBSET_DROP,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn remove_capability_from_bounding_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAPBSET_DROP, capability as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_SECUREBITS/PR_SET_SECUREBITS -// - -const PR_GET_SECUREBITS: c_int = 27; - -bitflags! { - /// `SECBIT_*`. - #[repr(transparent)] - #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)] - pub struct CapabilitiesSecureBits: u32 { - /// If this bit is set, then the kernel does not grant capabilities - /// when a `set-user-ID-root` program is executed, or when a process - /// with an effective or real UID of 0 calls `execve`. - const NO_ROOT = 1_u32 << 0; - /// Set [`NO_ROOT`] irreversibly. - const NO_ROOT_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 1; - /// Setting this flag stops the kernel from adjusting the process' - /// permitted, effective, and ambient capability sets when the thread's - /// effective and filesystem UIDs are switched between zero and nonzero - /// values. - const NO_SETUID_FIXUP = 1_u32 << 2; - /// Set [`NO_SETUID_FIXUP`] irreversibly. - const NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 3; - /// Setting this flag allows a thread that has one or more 0 UIDs to - /// retain capabilities in its permitted set when it switches all of - /// its UIDs to nonzero values. - const KEEP_CAPS = 1_u32 << 4; - /// Set [`KEEP_CAPS`] irreversibly. - const KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 5; - /// Setting this flag disallows raising ambient capabilities via the - /// `prctl`'s `PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE` operation. - const NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE = 1_u32 << 6; - /// Set [`NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE`] irreversibly. - const NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED = 1_u32 << 7; - - /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags> - const _ = !0; - } -} - -/// Get the `securebits` flags of the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn capabilities_secure_bits() -> io::Result<CapabilitiesSecureBits> { - let r = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_SECUREBITS)? } as c_uint; - CapabilitiesSecureBits::from_bits(r).ok_or(io::Errno::RANGE) -} - -const PR_SET_SECUREBITS: c_int = 28; - -/// Set the `securebits` flags of the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn set_capabilities_secure_bits(bits: CapabilitiesSecureBits) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits.bits() as usize as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_TIMERSLACK/PR_SET_TIMERSLACK -// - -const PR_GET_TIMERSLACK: c_int = 30; - -/// Get the `current` timer slack value of the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn current_timer_slack() -> io::Result<u64> { - unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_TIMERSLACK) }.map(|r| r as u64) -} - -const PR_SET_TIMERSLACK: c_int = 29; - -/// Sets the `current` timer slack value for the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn set_current_timer_slack(value: Option<NonZeroU64>) -> io::Result<()> { - let value = usize::try_from(value.map_or(0, NonZeroU64::get)).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::RANGE)?; - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_TIMERSLACK, value as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS/PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS -// - -const PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: c_int = 39; - -/// Get the value of the `no_new_privs` attribute for the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn no_new_privs() -> io::Result<bool> { - unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_NO_NEW_PRIVS) }.map(|r| r != 0) -} - -const PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS: c_int = 38; - -/// Set the calling thread's `no_new_privs` attribute. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn set_no_new_privs(no_new_privs: bool) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, usize::from(no_new_privs) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS -// - -const PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS: c_int = 40; - -/// Get the `clear_child_tid` address set by `set_tid_address` -/// and `clone`'s `CLONE_CHILD_CLEARTID` flag. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn get_clear_child_tid_address() -> io::Result<Option<NonNull<c_void>>> { - unsafe { prctl_get_at_arg2_optional::<*mut c_void>(PR_GET_TID_ADDRESS) }.map(NonNull::new) -} - -// -// PR_GET_THP_DISABLE/PR_SET_THP_DISABLE -// - -const PR_GET_THP_DISABLE: c_int = 42; - -/// Get the current setting of the `THP disable` flag for the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn transparent_huge_pages_are_disabled() -> io::Result<bool> { - unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_THP_DISABLE) }.map(|r| r != 0) -} - -const PR_SET_THP_DISABLE: c_int = 41; - -/// Set the state of the `THP disable` flag for the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn disable_transparent_huge_pages(thp_disable: bool) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_SET_THP_DISABLE, usize::from(thp_disable) as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_CAP_AMBIENT -// - -const PR_CAP_AMBIENT: c_int = 47; - -const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET: usize = 1; - -/// Check if the specified capability is in the ambient set. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn capability_is_in_ambient_set(capability: Capability) -> io::Result<bool> { - let cap = capability as usize as *mut _; - unsafe { prctl_3args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_IS_SET as *mut _, cap) }.map(|r| r != 0) -} - -const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL: usize = 4; - -/// Remove all capabilities from the ambient set. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn clear_ambient_capability_set() -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { prctl_2args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, PR_CAP_AMBIENT_CLEAR_ALL as *mut _) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE: usize = 2; -const PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER: usize = 3; - -/// Add or remove the specified capability to the ambient set. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_CAP_AMBIENT,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn configure_capability_in_ambient_set(capability: Capability, enable: bool) -> io::Result<()> { - let sub_operation = if enable { - PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE - } else { - PR_CAP_AMBIENT_LOWER - }; - let cap = capability as usize as *mut _; - - unsafe { prctl_3args(PR_CAP_AMBIENT, sub_operation as *mut _, cap) }.map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_SVE_GET_VL/PR_SVE_SET_VL -// - -const PR_SVE_GET_VL: c_int = 51; - -const PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK: u32 = 0xffff; -const PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT: u32 = 1_u32 << 17; - -/// Scalable Vector Extension vector length configuration. -#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] -pub struct SVEVectorLengthConfig { - /// Vector length in bytes. - pub vector_length_in_bytes: u32, - /// Vector length inherited across `execve`. - pub vector_length_inherited_across_execve: bool, -} - -/// Get the thread's current SVE vector length configuration. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SVE_GET_VL,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SVE_GET_VL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn sve_vector_length_configuration() -> io::Result<SVEVectorLengthConfig> { - let bits = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_SVE_GET_VL)? } as c_uint; - Ok(SVEVectorLengthConfig { - vector_length_in_bytes: bits & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK, - vector_length_inherited_across_execve: (bits & PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT) != 0, - }) -} - -const PR_SVE_SET_VL: c_int = 50; - -const PR_SVE_SET_VL_ONEXEC: u32 = 1_u32 << 18; - -/// Configure the thread's vector length of Scalable Vector Extension. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SVE_SET_VL,...)`] -/// -/// # Safety -/// -/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, -/// as detailed in the references above. -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SVE_SET_VL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub unsafe fn set_sve_vector_length_configuration( - vector_length_in_bytes: usize, - vector_length_inherited_across_execve: bool, - defer_change_to_next_execve: bool, -) -> io::Result<()> { - let vector_length_in_bytes = - u32::try_from(vector_length_in_bytes).map_err(|_r| io::Errno::RANGE)?; - - let mut bits = vector_length_in_bytes & PR_SVE_VL_LEN_MASK; - - if vector_length_inherited_across_execve { - bits |= PR_SVE_VL_INHERIT; - } - - if defer_change_to_next_execve { - bits |= PR_SVE_SET_VL_ONEXEC; - } - - prctl_2args(PR_SVE_SET_VL, bits as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS -// - -const PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS: c_int = 54; - -/// Securely reset the thread's pointer authentication keys to fresh random -/// values generated by the kernel. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS,...)`] -/// -/// # Safety -/// -/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, -/// as detailed in the references above. -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub unsafe fn reset_pointer_authentication_keys( - keys: Option<PointerAuthenticationKeys>, -) -> io::Result<()> { - let keys = keys.as_ref().map_or(0_u32, PointerAuthenticationKeys::bits); - prctl_2args(PR_PAC_RESET_KEYS, keys as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL/PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL -// - -const PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: c_int = 56; - -const PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT: u32 = 3; -const PR_MTE_TAG_MASK: u32 = 0xffff_u32 << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT; - -bitflags! { - /// Zero means addresses that are passed for the purpose of being - /// dereferenced by the kernel must be untagged. - #[repr(transparent)] - #[derive(Copy, Clone, Eq, PartialEq, Hash, Debug)] - pub struct TaggedAddressMode: u32 { - /// Addresses that are passed for the purpose of being dereferenced by - /// the kernel may be tagged. - const ENABLED = 1_u32 << 0; - /// Synchronous tag check fault mode. - const TCF_SYNC = 1_u32 << 1; - /// Asynchronous tag check fault mode. - const TCF_ASYNC = 1_u32 << 2; - - /// <https://docs.rs/bitflags/*/bitflags/#externally-defined-flags> - const _ = !0; - } -} - -/// Get the current tagged address mode for the calling thread. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub fn current_tagged_address_mode() -> io::Result<(Option<TaggedAddressMode>, u32)> { - let r = unsafe { prctl_1arg(PR_GET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL)? } as c_uint; - let mode = r & 0b111_u32; - let mte_tag = (r & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK) >> PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT; - Ok((TaggedAddressMode::from_bits(mode), mte_tag)) -} - -const PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL: c_int = 55; - -/// Controls support for passing tagged user-space addresses to the kernel. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`] -/// -/// # Safety -/// -/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as -/// detailed in the references above. -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub unsafe fn set_current_tagged_address_mode( - mode: Option<TaggedAddressMode>, - mte_tag: u32, -) -> io::Result<()> { - let config = mode.as_ref().map_or(0_u32, TaggedAddressMode::bits) - | ((mte_tag << PR_MTE_TAG_SHIFT) & PR_MTE_TAG_MASK); - prctl_2args(PR_SET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, config as usize as *mut _).map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH -// - -const PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH: c_int = 59; - -const PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF: usize = 0; - -/// Disable Syscall User Dispatch mechanism. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF,...)`] -/// -/// # Safety -/// -/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as -/// detailed in the references above. -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub unsafe fn disable_syscall_user_dispatch() -> io::Result<()> { - prctl_2args(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, PR_SYS_DISPATCH_OFF as *mut _).map(|_r| ()) -} - -const PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON: usize = 1; - -/// Allow system calls to be executed. -const SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW: u8 = 0; -/// Block system calls from executing. -const SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK: u8 = 1; - -/// Value of the fast switch flag controlling system calls user dispatch -/// mechanism without the need to issue a syscall. -#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] -#[repr(u8)] -pub enum SysCallUserDispatchFastSwitch { - /// System calls are allowed to execute. - Allow = SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW, - /// System calls are blocked from executing. - Block = SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK, -} - -impl TryFrom<u8> for SysCallUserDispatchFastSwitch { - type Error = io::Errno; - - fn try_from(value: u8) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { - match value { - SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_ALLOW => Ok(Self::Allow), - SYSCALL_DISPATCH_FILTER_BLOCK => Ok(Self::Block), - _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE), - } - } -} - -/// Enable Syscall User Dispatch mechanism. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON,...)`] -/// -/// # Safety -/// -/// Please ensure the conditions necessary to safely call this function, as -/// detailed in the references above. -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH,PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON,...)`]: https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man2/prctl.2.html -#[inline] -pub unsafe fn enable_syscall_user_dispatch( - always_allowed_region: &[u8], - fast_switch_flag: &AtomicU8, -) -> io::Result<()> { - syscalls::prctl( - PR_SET_SYSCALL_USER_DISPATCH, - PR_SYS_DISPATCH_ON as *mut _, - always_allowed_region.as_ptr() as *mut _, - always_allowed_region.len() as *mut _, - as_ptr(fast_switch_flag) as *mut _, - ) - .map(|_r| ()) -} - -// -// PR_SCHED_CORE -// - -const PR_SCHED_CORE: c_int = 62; - -const PR_SCHED_CORE_GET: usize = 0; - -const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD: u32 = 0; -const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP: u32 = 1; -const PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP: u32 = 2; - -/// `PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_*`. -#[derive(Copy, Clone, Debug, Eq, PartialEq)] -#[repr(u32)] -pub enum CoreSchedulingScope { - /// Operation will be performed for the thread. - Thread = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD, - /// Operation will be performed for all tasks in the task group of the - /// process. - ThreadGroup = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP, - /// Operation will be performed for all processes in the process group. - ProcessGroup = PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP, -} - -impl TryFrom<u32> for CoreSchedulingScope { - type Error = io::Errno; - - fn try_from(value: u32) -> Result<Self, Self::Error> { - match value { - PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD => Ok(Self::Thread), - PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_THREAD_GROUP => Ok(Self::ThreadGroup), - PR_SCHED_CORE_SCOPE_PROCESS_GROUP => Ok(Self::ProcessGroup), - _ => Err(io::Errno::RANGE), - } - } -} - -/// Get core scheduling cookie of a process. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_GET,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_GET,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html -#[inline] -pub fn core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<u64> { - let mut value: MaybeUninit<u64> = MaybeUninit::uninit(); - unsafe { - syscalls::prctl( - PR_SCHED_CORE, - PR_SCHED_CORE_GET as *mut _, - pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _, - scope as usize as *mut _, - value.as_mut_ptr().cast(), - )?; - Ok(value.assume_init()) - } -} - -const PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE: usize = 1; - -/// Create unique core scheduling cookie. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html -#[inline] -pub fn create_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { - syscalls::prctl( - PR_SCHED_CORE, - PR_SCHED_CORE_CREATE as *mut _, - pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _, - scope as usize as *mut _, - ptr::null_mut(), - ) - .map(|_r| ()) - } -} - -const PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO: usize = 2; - -/// Push core scheduling cookie to a process. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html -#[inline] -pub fn push_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { - syscalls::prctl( - PR_SCHED_CORE, - PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_TO as *mut _, - pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _, - scope as usize as *mut _, - ptr::null_mut(), - ) - .map(|_r| ()) - } -} - -const PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM: usize = 3; - -/// Pull core scheduling cookie from a process. -/// -/// # References -/// - [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM,...)`] -/// -/// [`prctl(PR_SCHED_CORE,PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM,...)`]: https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v5.18/admin-guide/hw-vuln/core-scheduling.html -#[inline] -pub fn pull_core_scheduling_cookie(pid: Pid, scope: CoreSchedulingScope) -> io::Result<()> { - unsafe { - syscalls::prctl( - PR_SCHED_CORE, - PR_SCHED_CORE_SHARE_FROM as *mut _, - pid.as_raw_nonzero().get() as usize as *mut _, - scope as usize as *mut _, - ptr::null_mut(), - ) - .map(|_r| ()) - } -} |